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The Russian banking sector is in some respects a rather odd sector for inclusion in the present 
volume. To be sure, the sector’s development and the interactions between financial-sector 
business interests and the state have had implications for Russian foreign relations. However, 
despite the overseas ambitions of a few banks, the banking sector remains overwhelmingly 
focused on the domestic market. It has neither been the source of serious transnational conflict 
nor an important instrument for advancing Russia’s foreign policy agenda. It has, however, 
complicated Russia’s external relations from time to time. Usually, this has been a product of 
problems that afflict the banking system, such as corruption and money-laundering, or with the 
authorities’ manipulation of the system in ways that have subsequently proved embarrassing. 
The story of the banks’ role in Russian diplomacy is thus a story about the banks’ weakness 
rather than their strength.  
The structure and interests of the system 
This is not the place for a detailed assessment of the structure and development of Russia’s 
banking sector.2 However, it is necessary to highlight certain characteristics of the system before 
considering its actual and potential role in high politics and policy. First, the Russian banking 
sector, though growing rapidly since 1999, remains small and fragmented (Table 1). Russia still 
has a very large population of very small banks, a legacy of the administrative chaos of the last 
years of the Soviet Union and the extremely liberal licensing regime of the immediate post-
Soviet period.3 The average Russian bank at the end of 2004 had total assets of around Rb5.4bn 
($197m); the aggregate assets of the smallest 1,100 amounted to under $30.8bn, ($27.9m per 
bank). Many of these ‘dwarf banks’ are banks in name only and are used by the owners for other 
purposes, such as tax ‘optimization’ or money laundering. Even the largest Russian banks are 
quite small by international standards. In 2004, Russia’s largest bank, the state-owned Sberbank, 
ranked 152nd in the world by tier-1 capital. The largest private bank, Mezhprombank, was 
392nd.4 The small size of banks is particularly striking when contrasted with the size of Russia’s 
major industrial corporates, many of which are very large by any standards. As a result, Russia’s 
banks, unable to meet the financing needs of the country’s biggest borrowers, are losing many of 
their best clients to foreign rivals and to bond markets. Russia’s ‘blue-chips’ increasingly find 
that they are able to borrow larger sums, for longer periods and on better terms, from foreign 
banks and capital markets.  
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Table 1. Selected balance-sheet indicators of the Russian banking sector 
1998–2004 (% of GDP unless otherwise indicated, end of period) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number of operating credit institutions 1476 1349 1311 1319 1329 1329 1299 
Assets 39.8 32.9 32.3 35.3 38.3 42.4 42.5 
Capital (own funds) 2.9 3.5 3.9 5.1 5.4 6.2 5.6 
Funds attracted from physical persons 7.6 6.2 6.1 7.6 9.5 11.5 11.7 
Funds attracted from enterprises and organisations 10.7 9.7 9.9 10.1 10.1 10.5 11.8 
Credits extended to non-financial enterprises and 
organisations (as percentage of total assets) 
11.4 
(28.5) 
9.2 
(28.0) 
10.4 
(32.1) 
13.2 
(37.2) 
14.7 
(38.4) 
17.2 
(40.5) 
18.8 
(44.1) 
Source: Central Bank of Russia. 
Secondly, the banking system tends to be segmented, along regional, sectoral and ‘group’ 
lines. A large proportion of Russian banks (the great majority, according to some observers) are 
‘pocket banks’, controlled by a single large shareholder or a small group of related shareholders, 
who operate the bank for their own convenience. As noted above, this sometimes involves 
running banks for legally dubious purposes, but in other cases, such pocket banks merely 
function as external ‘corporate treasuries’, reflecting above all the desire of their owners to retain 
tight control over their own financial flows. Thus, most pocket banks are best understood as 
tools of business groupings or state institutions rather than independent, profit-oriented 
businesses, although some pocket banks have gradually developed into more substantial 
financial institutions. Even they, however, generally retain their links to their founder-owners. 
Whether pocket banks or not, Russian banks are often closely affiliated with specific financial-
industrial groupings—be they middle-sized regional groupings or the ‘oligarchic’ groups that 
loom so large on the national political scene. Such banks are chiefly oriented to serving the 
needs of group members. This tendency is reinforced by factors such as poor creditor protection 
and lack of transparency, which make intra-group operations less risky than arm’s-length 
transactions. In general, therefore, the banking sector remains highly segmented, with little trust 
among banks. The inter-bank market, though growing, is under-developed, and there is still very 
little of the sort of interaction among banks typically found in a well functioning network of 
financial intermediaries—i.e. there is little pooling, trading or sharing of risk.5  
Thirdly, despite the efforts of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) to promote transparency in 
the sector, both the formal ownership structures of Russian banks and many of their activities 
tend to be opaque. Banks’ connections to their beneficial owners are often concealed behind 
complex webs of nominee shareholders, trusts and offshore companies, even when the identities 
of the true owners are well known. This is generally legal. In an IFC survey conducted in 2003, 
half of the banks responding admitted that they did not disclose the names of their real owners.6 
Opacity of ownership reduces both transparency and confidence in a system where lack of trust 
is already a problem. It also impedes efforts to implement new criteria concerning who is ‘fit’ to 
own and/or manage Russian banks and undermines efforts to control related-party transactions.7 
Moreover, the lack of transparency surrounding ownership is closely linked to the lack of 
transparency surrounding much of what banks do: although the pace of banking reform has 
accelerated markedly since the appointment of Sergei Ignat’ev as CBR chairman in 2002, the 
sector remains under-governed, and a great many banks are actively engaged in activities that 
are—at best—legally questionable and in many cases are clearly criminal.8 
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A fourth important characteristic of the sector is the extent to which it continues to be 
dominated by the state. At the beginning of 2004, there were 20 banks in which the state (federal 
or regional authorities) held majority stakes.9 Such banks accounted for 68% of retail deposits, 
29% of capital, 36% of assets and 38% of credit outstanding to the non-financial private sector. 
They also accounted for 80% of Russian government bonds in the portfolios of Russian banks. 
In addition, regional authorities held minority stakes in many banks and a large number of state 
unitary enterprises were part-owners of banks. The most important state-owned banks are the 
savings monopolist Sberbank and the former foreign trade bank Vneshtorgbank (VTB); they are 
also the largest banks in Russia in terms of both capital and assets. While ownership of VTB has 
been transferred to the government, the CBR continues to hold the state’s controlling stake in 
Sberbank. This presents a number of conflicts of interest: the CBR is at once the sector’s 
regulator, its largest single creditor and the owner of its biggest bank. It also has considerable 
control over most aspects of insolvency proceedings in the sector. Finally, many private 
commercial banks have developed on the basis of close links to state institutions, relying on 
political connections to secure various benefits. Many regional banks have established near-
monopoly positions on local markets thanks to official backing.10  
There are good reasons for seeing state dominance as a problem. State ownership and state 
intervention in credit allocation tend to distort competition, to aggravate moral hazard by 
encouraging the expectation of a bailout, and to undermine the efficiency of intermediation, as 
banks often pursue policies that reflect the non-commercial requirements of the authorities rather 
than good commercial sense.11 The short history of Russia’s banking sector exemplifies many of 
these problems, particularly with respect to competition and the imposition of hard budget 
constraints on banks. State-owned banks (both federal and regional) have continued to derive 
substantial competitive advantages from state ownership, especially Sberbank.12 In addition to 
the explicit state guarantee backing their retail deposits, which was scrapped only at the end of 
2003, state-owned banks have enjoyed privileged access to state funds, de facto exemption from 
some regulatory norms and, on occasion, financial support from the state. Their cost of capital is 
reduced by the perception that the state will stand behind them, an implicit guarantee that is little 
affected by recent legal changes. Sberbank, moreover, is the only Russian bank with a fully 
developed (indeed, over-developed) branch network. This gives it a near-monopoly in handling 
things like pension and utilities payments, which bring with them large volumes of low-cost 
funds. At the same time, state-owned banks have at times been required to perform unprofitable 
‘social functions’ on behalf of the state or to adopt policies that reflect the requirements of 
macroeconomic management rather than profitability.  
Many of the problems outlined above were evident in the banking ‘mini-crisis’ of May–
July 2004, when the CBR’s intervention in the case of a bank accused of money–laundering 
triggered several weeks of turbulence and placed a number of banks under strain.13 The CBR’s 
attempt to impose a temporary administration on the bank in question, Sodbiznesbank, was 
bound to be unsettling—it was, after all, the first time such an intervention had occurred before a 
bank had actually defaulted on its obligations. However, the situation was exacerbated by the 
uncertainty about Sodbiznesbank’s ownership, which led to pressure on banks thought to be 
linked to it via common owners, and by rumors of a ‘black list’ of banks slated for closure by the 
authorities, which led to runs on several banks. A number of players in the sector appear to have 
fuelled the rumors and speculation in an effort to undermine rivals. Lack of trust among banks, 
as well as the awareness that almost any bank might be found to have shady deals on its books 
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(and thus to be vulnerable to such intervention) led to a drying up of liquidity on the inter-bank 
market, putting pressure on the hundreds of smaller banks that are highly dependent on it. At the 
same time, rumors concerning black lists and political vendettas were widely accepted as true, 
partly because neither the banks nor the general public had much faith in the authorities’ 
impartiality and partly because, in the case of Guta-bank, at least, political factors do seem to 
have underlain the bank’s troubles. While the turbulence eventually abated, the whole episode 
highlighted problems of opacity and lack of trust, as well as the widespread (and well founded) 
belief that many banks were engaged in legally dubious activities.  
Finally, it is important to note that there is still relatively little foreign involvement in the 
sector. At the beginning of 2004, non-residents owned stakes in only 128 Russian credit 
institutions, of which 32 were wholly foreign-owned. The foreign share of the sector’s total 
capital in early 2005 was estimated at 5.2%, down from 10.7% at the beginning of 2000, and 
majority foreign-owned banks accounted for 7.6% of sector assets. This picture contrasts starkly 
with Central Europe, where local banking systems are now largely foreign-owned. Russia does 
not necessarily need or want a banking sector dominated by foreign players, but it does need a 
higher level of foreign involvement in the sector, if only to reap the benefits foreign banks can 
bring in terms of skills, technology and credibility. The lack of foreign involvement is partly a 
product of protectionist policies, but the significance of bank protectionism should not be 
exaggerated.  
While there was, for almost a decade, a 12% ceiling on the foreign capital share in the 
sector, the cap had never actually had legal force and foreign banks never came close to 
breaching it anyway, except for a brief period immediately after the 1998 financial crisis.14 Its 
real importance was not legal but symbolic: the existence of the ceiling sent a strong signal to 
foreign investors about the CBR’s attitude towards foreign entry. Formally, it was scrapped in 
2002, after Sergei Ignat’ev replaced Viktor Gerashchenko as CBR chairman. A number of lesser 
restrictions on foreign involvement remain, including the requirement that the central bank 
approve any acquisition of shares in a Russian bank by non-residents, but the CBR under 
Ignat’ev has adopted a much more positive attitude towards foreign banks and is working to 
relax many of the remaining restrictions.15 The most contentious issue remains the Russian 
authorities’ insistence that foreign banks entering the Russian market establish fully capitalized 
Russian subsidiaries rather than simply opening local branches. That said, the real deterrents to 
foreign entry are generally reckoned to be informal rather than formal: the weak contracting 
environment, the attitude of officialdom and the difficulties of operating in Russia’s opaque and 
sometimes unstable financial system all constitute much more serious obstacles to entry than the 
formal rules administered by the CBR. 
The evolving political role of Russian banks 
The above overview already suggests a number of important points about the political role of 
Russia’s banking sector. First, the banks are not—and, contrary to popular belief, rarely have 
been—a particularly powerful sectoral lobby. Secondly, this is at least in part a function of the 
sector’s fragmented structure, which is reflected in its politics. Rarely has it ever acted as a 
unified force, even when lobbying the authorities with respect to very sector-specific issues—a 
reality highlighted by the rivalry that exists between the two major banking organizations, the 
Association of Russian Banks and the Association of Regional Banks ‘Rossiya’. Banks’ 
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lobbying activities tend to be highly particularistic: individual banks or bankers tend to lobby 
specific politicians and officials to secure their interests. In this, of course, the banks’ behavior is 
perfectly typical of business lobbying in Russia more generally. Thirdly, major banks identify 
far more closely with the regions, industrial sectors and business groupings to which they are 
linked than with any broader sectoral lobby. While groups of banks do sometimes join together 
in an effort to influence policy, bank lobbying is generally most effective when supported by the 
large industrial companies and groupings to which so many banks are allied.16 Finally, a great 
deal of policy still reflects the entrenched power of the big state banks, particularly Sberbank and 
VTB, and the authorities’ reluctance to restructure them in order to level the competitive playing 
field between state and private banks. 
Banks and the state in the 1990s 
A look at the political history of Russian banks illustrates these points and quickly makes clear 
that Russia’s commercial banks have generally been less powerful than they sometimes appear. 
Banks in the early 1990s were not an especially powerful lobby at federal level. This was the 
period when industrial lobbies came to dominate the government. The government’s industrial 
lobby grew steadily more influential in the cabinet from June 1992, as growing resistance to the 
‘market Bolshevism’ of the Gaidar government led to the promotion of ‘industrialists’ like 
Viktor Chernomyrdin, Oleg Soskovets and Oleg Lobov. The banks did not have much of a role 
in policy-making at this time, nor did they really need one in order to do well. They were making 
easy profits from trade finance, foreign exchange speculation and the handling of state accounts, 
soft credits and other official financial flows. As Frye observes, the banks profited handsomely 
from the lax financial policies of the time, but these policies were adopted under pressure from 
industrial and regional lobbies and supported by a CBR chief—Gerashchenko—who regarded 
support for the real sector as a key priority for the central bank, even at the expense of price 
stability. In short, the banks were well positioned to appropriate a share of the rents being 
generated by and for other actors. 17 
The banks did not evince much interest in using their rapidly growing wealth for political 
ends during this period, beyond ensuring that the state did not curtail the speculative 
opportunities they were exploiting. The government’s remaining liberal reformers, who were 
later identified very closely with the leading banks, viewed them with suspicion at this stage, for 
at least three reasons. First, many banks were obviously shaky (and shady) institutions. 
Secondly, the banks were closely tied to the CBR, then headed by the liberals’ bête noir, 
Gerashchenko. Thirdly, the banks were perceived as enemies of stabilisation. It was thus no 
accident that the liberal architects of Russia’s early privatization policies worked to limit the 
banks’ participation in that process. Banks were barred from acquiring equity stakes in 
enterprises undergoing privatization, and their shareholdings were limited to 10% of the shares 
of any given company and 5% of the banks’ own assets.18  
These restrictions did not appear to have upset the banks much at the time. In any case, the 
earliest attempts to organize some sort of real sectoral lobby were encountering limited success, 
at best, even with respect to issues of direct concern to the sector. The Association of Russian 
Banks (ARB) purported to speak for the sector, but many of the largest banks refused to join. 
The organization came to be seen by many as a vehicle for small and medium banks only, 
although critics argued that its agenda was largely determined by a small number of larger 
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banks.19 Tensions within the sector manifested themselves in the battles surrounding the passage 
of the 1995 banking law. On issues where the sector was united, it generally prevailed: the banks 
preserved a degree of protection from foreign entry in the banking law and gained the right to 
deal in shares and securities for which no special license was required under federal law. On 
other issues, however, the banking lobby split. On the issue of charter capital increases, the great 
mass of small and medium banks, backed by powerful regional elites, secured an important 
victory over their larger Moscow- and St Petersburg-based rivals. Article 11 of the law stated 
flatly that the CBR could not apply increases in the minimum charter capital requirement to 
existing banks. This effectively closed off one strategy for forcing the consolidation of the 
sector, something smaller banks had feared and some larger banks had seen as a welcome 
opportunity to extend their reach into the regions. For similar reasons, the big banks based in the 
capitals pressed for liberal rules on the opening of new branches, which their smaller rivals 
opposed. That round went to the ‘federals’, but the big banks soon discovered the limits of their 
victory, as regional authorities continued in many cases to pursue protectionist policies designed 
to keep the big metropolitan banks at bay.20 Tensions within the sector continued to grow in 
1995, chiefly as a result of the authorities’ renewed push for macroeconomic stabilization. In 
August 1995, tightening liquidity conditions triggered a crisis on the inter-bank market. Once 
again, the banking lobby split, as financially stronger banks failed to back the ARB’s calls for 
state support, tacitly favoring the bankruptcy of their weaker rivals instead. 
The tightening of monetary conditions in conjunction with the stabilization policies of 
1995–98 aggravated both the real sector’s problems with access to finance and the government’s 
fiscal problems. The banks, too, felt the strain of stabilization, but, with a near-monopoly on 
rouble liquidity in an increasingly liquidity-starved economy, they found it easy to exploit the 
situation. As Gaddy and Ickes observed, ‘in the land of the cashless, the man with pocket change 
is king, or at least an oligarch…. It is the Russian tycoons’ relatively cash-rich status in a 
cashless economy that gives them so much power.’21 Real sector enterprises needing access to 
finance thus had every incentive to develop their own pocket banks or to draw closer to friendly 
banks. At the same time, the government itself came to depend increasingly on the banks for 
short-term financing—despite the fact that the banks themselves were in some cases actively 
pursuing strategies that aggravated the government’s fiscal headaches. Other factors 
strengthened the banks further. The beleaguered position of President Boris Yeltsin in 1995–96 
left the Kremlin particularly vulnerable to bank lobbying, while the government’s remaining 
liberal reformers searched for allies to help them shore up their positions in a cabinet dominated 
increasingly by people like Chernomyrdin and Soskovets. Corruption, too, may have played a 
role: the instability and uncertainty of 1995–96 do appear to have fuelled it, particularly at the 
highest levels. In late 1995, officials in the government apparatus claimed that the main problem 
they faced in dealing with the Kremlin was that their colleagues in the presidential 
administration believed that the Yeltsin era would soon end and were consequently preoccupied 
with arranging jobs for themselves outside the Kremlin and establishing contacts in the business 
community.22 Such officials would have made far easier targets for the banks’ lobbying efforts. 
These circumstances formed the backdrop for the infamous loans-for-shares deals of 1995–97. 
It would, nevertheless, be a mistake to view loans-for-shares and other give-away 
privatizations of 1995–97 solely in terms of the banks’ political muscle.23 While the banking 
lobby was at its most powerful during 1995–97, such deals generally took place when the banks 
had managed to forge alliances with key industrial companies. Hostile acquisitions were rare and 
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were fiercely contested. Even prior to the loans-for-shares auctions, banks had generally 
preferred acquiring stakes in enterprises with whose managers they had close relationships.24 
Despite their enormous financial problems, the industrialists’ position was far from weak. In the 
absence of a credible bankruptcy threat, they did not need to surrender control to outsiders 
simply because their finances were a mess, nor were they inclined to do so. In the end, the vast 
majority of enterprises originally slated for inclusion in the infamous loans-for-shares auctions 
were able to lobby their way out.25 Only nine of the original list of 64 actually ended up on the 
auction block. Three of these had the funds to secure control of their own shares, albeit in 
auctions that effectively excluded other participants, and five were acquired by banks to which 
they were already closely linked. The only major exception was the non-ferrous metals giant 
Norilsk Nickel. Oneksimbank acquired a controlling stake in this concern against its managers’ 
wishes and had to fight a protracted legal, commercial and political battle to secure real control. 
In short, the bank-driven loans-for-shares privatizations are in reality best understood as simply a 
further stage in the process of privatization to insiders that began with the asset-stripping of the 
late Soviet period and continued during the voucher phase of 1992–94. 
Even at the peak of their political influence, in the mid-1990s, Russian banks were small 
and often unstable. Their survival depended chiefly on the patronage of the state, to which they 
were closely linked in every sphere of activity.26 Indeed, although the banking sector in the mid-
1990s was regarded by some as the sector ‘most advanced as far as the progress of market 
reforms is concerned’,27 it actually had a strong claim to being the most subsidized in the 
Russian economy.28 The subsidies it received persisted even as state support for other sectors 
dried up, in large measure because they were usually implicit rather than explicit subsidies. The 
reputed power of Russia’s banks in the mid-nineties must thus be viewed alongside this very 
dependent position vis-à-vis the state. The image of hugely powerful banks dominating a weak 
state tended to obscure the reality that both were weak. The state’s reliance on the banks 
reflected its inability to perform a number of basic functions, while the bank’s reliance on the 
state reflected their limited ability to survive without easy access to state funds. What the 
scandals of 1996–98 highlighted most of all was the extent to which the banks’ futures depended 
on this access. The so-called ‘banking wars’ of 1997 thus reflected banks’ vulnerability more 
than their strength. Tighter monetary policies, exchange rate stabilization, falling yields on 
government securities and lower inflation put the banks under enormous pressure. Central bank 
credit became more expensive, reserve requirements grew tougher, and access to budgetary 
funds was curtailed. With so many sources of state subsidy drying up, the battle for those that 
remained, and especially for control of state assets still to be privatized, could not but escalate. 
Banks and the state under Vladimir Putin 
The foregoing analysis suggests why the banks have been less politically prominent since the 
crisis than they were before it. The most important factor of all was clearly the passing of the 
extreme illiquidity that afflicted the economy during 1995–98. Indeed, the main problem 
afflicting the financial system during 2000–04 was excess liquidity. The re-monetization of the 
real sector and the related dramatic transformation of state finances greatly reduced the banks’ 
political leverage. The corporate balance of forces also changed. In the post-devaluation 
recovery that began in 1999, money was made chiefly from the economic rents associated with 
the exploitation of natural resources. Control over oil, gas and metals, rather than mere liquidity 
(no longer such a scarce commodity), represented the keys to real wealth and economic power. 
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This coincided with changes in the structure of the more dynamic groupings like Rosprom and 
Interros. The centre of gravity within these groupings shifted from the banks to the parent 
holdings or the core resource-exporting companies.  
This shift in the internal balance of power within the groupings also reflects the shift in the 
sources of their profits. In the mid-1990s, super-profits were earned in the government securities 
markets, where real yields on short-term GKOs reached triple-digit annual rates. The incentives 
to strip industrial assets and accumulate payment arrears in order to play the GKO market were 
enormous, and this is precisely what many managers did. In the post-crisis recovery, however, it 
was exports, particularly oil exports, which generated huge profits. Even many of Russia’s 
processing industries returned to profit. The banks’ role as profit-generators was dramatically 
reduced. The ‘banking wars’ of the 1990s gave way to ‘oligarch hunting’ and conflicts among 
powerful groupings in various industrial sectors. Battles among oil companies, metals producers 
and other industrial concerns—not bankers—now tend to dominate the headlines where 
commerce meets politics. The politically prominent bankers of the 1990s who remained major 
players after the financial crisis were those with strong positions in other sectors. Those like 
SBS-Agro’s Aleksandr Smolenskii and Inkombank’s Vladimir Vinogradov, who failed to 
establish themselves as dominant players in other sectors, proved far more vulnerable—
politically and financially—after the crisis. Thus, Vladimir Potanin is now more closely involved 
with Interros and, in particular, Norilsk Nickel, than with Oneksimbank’s successor, Rosbank. 
Even before the financial crisis, Mikhail Khodorkovskii left Bank Menatep to head the Rosprom 
Financial-Industrial Group. The official assault on Khodorkovskii launched in mid-2003 led to 
the dismemberment of Yukos, while Menatep’s successor banks hardly figured in the affair.  
One area in which there is all too much continuity with the past is the treatment of state-
owned banks. Official policy is that state-owned banks should exist—if at all—to correct market 
failures. Their activities should be concentrated in sectoral and other niches which the market 
will not address on its own.29 In practice, however, the major state-owned banks tend to operate 
as universal banks, with Sberbank, in particular, exploiting its protected retail monopoly to 
extend its business in other directions. It is now the dominant bank in a number of market 
segments, not only retail. Sberbank’s size and status thus distort competition in many segments 
of the banking market. The same might be said, albeit to a lesser degree, of VTB. The 
inconsistency of policy with respect to state banks was particularly evident during the mini-crisis 
of the summer of 2004. The CBR, having refused to extend a stabilization credit to the pressured 
Guta-bank, instead lent $100m to VTB, enabling it to buy Guta and thus to nationalize one of the 
country’s larger private banks. There is some reason to believe that the CBR extended this loan 
under strong pressure from elements of the presidential administration. At the same time, the 
CBR appears to have encouraged Sberbank to step up its activities on the inter-bank market in 
order to ease the liquidity problems of smaller banks. Since Sberbank traditionally does around 
90% of its inter-bank lending to foreign banks, this amounted to asking the savings monopolist 
to undertake a major change in its commercial practices, at very short notice, in order to suit the 
needs of the monetary authorities. In short, the CBR once again succumbed to the temptation to 
use Sberbank as a policy instrument. 
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The banks and foreign policy: the potential for conflict—and embarrassment 
Much of what can be said about the role (or lack thereof) of Russia’s banks in shaping its foreign 
policy follows directly from the above analysis of the banking sector and its politics. Rarely do 
the interests of specific banks or of the banking lobby as a whole appear to have been important 
in determining the course of Russian foreign policy. This is hardly surprising. Russian banks 
remain overwhelmingly focused on the rapidly growing domestic market; few are seriously 
interested in overseas expansion (particularly outside the CIS) and fewer still in a position to 
pursue that interest. The most active Russian banks abroad tend to be those closely affiliated 
with major financial-industrial groups. Such banks often move abroad in the footsteps of the 
other members of their respective groups (an exception is the state-owned Vneshtorgbank). Nor 
have banks served as important instruments of foreign policy in the way that, for example, 
Gazprom has sometimes done.  
Where the banks’ interests and activities do seem to have had a significant impact on 
Russia’s foreign relations, it has been the sector’s weakness and its specific pathologies, rather 
than its lobby power, which have tended to be at issue. The frequent crises, large and small, that 
have rocked the Russian banking system at intervals since 1991 have sometimes done the 
country’s image considerable, albeit usually temporary, damage. In addition to highlighting 
Russia’s financial fragility, banking crises and scandals have often drawn attention to the seedier 
side of Russia’s often very dirty business environment. A brief analysis of two specific issues—
protectionism and money laundering—will serve to illustrate the ways in which banking sector 
weakness sometimes complicates Russia’s foreign relations. 
Protectionism  
Since the early 1990s, Russia’s banks have been protected from foreign competition by a variety 
of formal and informal mechanisms. The issue of foreign access to the banking sector has 
loomed large in discussions of Russia’s WTO accession. As noted above, for roughly a decade 
until 2002 there was widely perceived to be a 12% limit on the foreign capital share in the 
sector. In fact, the quota was never legally enforceable. No method for calculating this quota was 
ever officially approved and official statements on the subject were contradictory.30 Since neither 
the size of the quota nor the formula for applying it was ever agreed, it was simply assumed that 
the 12% ceiling announced by the CBR in 1993 remained in force. Its formal removal in 2002 
thus had little or no legal significance, although it sent a powerful signal to foreign banks about 
the authorities’ attitude towards foreign entry.  
There is little doubt that the protectionist measures adopted in the early 1990s were in large 
measure a product of bank lobbying. A number of local banks actively lobbied for protection, 
deploying an ‘infant industry’ argument. In addition to the capital ceiling, the authorities 
imposed a moratorium on foreign banks’ servicing of Russian clients, and a range of other 
regulations, such as those restricting the employment of expatriate staff and governing the 
appointment of foreigners as top managers or board members of Russian banks. The practical 
significance of these rules depended to a great extent upon the judgments of the CBR.31  
By 1996–97, the domestic political pressure for protection was waning. Thus, the 
moratorium on foreign banks’ handling of Russian clients was allowed to lapse as scheduled, on 
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1 January 1996, and other restrictions on foreign banks’ activities were gradually eased. Later 
on, the minimum charter capital for establishing a foreign bank was reduced from €10m to the 
€5m required of new local banks. By 1996–97, the banking lobby had split over the issue of 
protection, as over so many other issues. The largest and most ambitious banks were starting to 
think (prematurely, as it turned out in most cases) in terms of overseas expansion. They 
understood that opening the sector up somewhat would be necessary if they were to enter foreign 
markets. In any case, it had become clear by the mid-1990s that the threat of foreign competition 
was exaggerated. Russian banks operating on their home turf enjoyed significant competitive 
advantages vis-à-vis their foreign rivals.32 Russian firms found local banks quicker to take 
decisions and less demanding when it came to their requirements for financial information. 
Many Russian businesses were unable or unwilling to provide information that would meet 
western standards. While their professional and technological sophistication grew rapidly in the 
mid-1990s, Russian banks continued to levy much lower fees for their services. They were 
also—and this was, for many businesses, a crucial consideration—far more willing than their 
foreign rivals to participate in ‘grey’ tax-evasion and capital-export schemes, which were legally 
dubious but were nonetheless standard operating procedures for many Russian corporates.  
There was and is, to be sure, some danger than foreign banks entering Russia on favorable 
terms might be able to ‘cherry pick’ the most promising of the Russian banks’ clients—chiefly, 
the country’s large resource exporters, plus a few prominent companies oriented towards the 
domestic market, such as Wimm-Bill-Dann. However, such companies have hitherto tended to 
retain Russian banks for local services, while successfully tapping foreign capital markets and 
banks abroad. Access to external markets means that the remaining protections in force do little 
to prevent large Russian corporates from raising foreign capital. 
As the foregoing implies, many of the most important barriers to foreign entry arguably had 
little to do with the sort of explicitly protectionist measures adopted in 1993–96. The under-
governed, often corrupt nature of the financial system itself was a deterrent to many foreign 
banks, as was the recognition of the fact that the attitudes of officials—federal or local, in the 
CBR or in other state institutions—mattered at least as much as the formal rules in determining 
what kind of welcome a foreign bank might receive on entering any given market. The elaborate 
system of foreign exchange controls constituted another impediment to foreign entry. Gradually 
relaxed before 1998, the currency control regime was tightened up again after the crisis, and the 
lifting of those controls is still not complete. Currency controls—which were viewed as a 
nuisance by Russian as well as foreign banks—were adopted as tools of macroeconomic 
management but their effect was undoubtedly to discriminate against foreign banks. 
Nevertheless, while the domestic political pressure for protection waned after the mid-
1990s, numerous restrictions on foreign involvement have remained in force. Even now, the 
CBR must approve any acquisition of shares in a Russian bank by non-residents. The CBR is 
pressing for the removal of many of these restrictions, but it continues to stand firm on what has 
become the most contentious issue of all: Russia’s insistence that foreign banks wishing to enter 
the sector must form fully capitalized subsidiaries, registered in the Russian Federation, rather 
than simply opening local branches of their overseas parent banks.  
How, then might we account for continued protectionism, if not in terms of the power of 
the banking lobby? The first point to make is that declining pressure for protection should not be 
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equated with mounting pressure for liberalization. There was no strong domestic lobby in favor 
of opening up the banking sector, and a substantial part of the banking community, as well as 
many nationalist politicians, did remain opposed. The role of the latter in maintaining some 
protections should not be underestimated, as the fear of a foreign-dominated financial system 
runs deep among elements of Russia’s political elite. Moreover, the access regime in place after 
1993–95 effectively left the CBR as the gate-keeper to the sector, a role that some in the CBR, 
including Viktor Gerashchenko, appear to have been determined to retain. Their preferred model 
for foreign entry, particularly after the crisis, was for foreign investors to buy—with CBR 
approval, of course—stakes in Russian banks.33 In any case, since there was little evidence that 
liberalization would trigger a flood of foreign investment into the sector, the Russian authorities 
had little incentive to liberalize autonomously—many policy-makers clearly preferred waiting 
until there was a quid pro quo on offer, which is why the issue came to be so important in the 
context of Russia’s WTO negotiations.  
This brings us to the issue of branching versus subsidiaries, which remains one of the most 
problematic WTO accession issues. Here, the principal source of opposition is the CBR rather 
than the banking lobby, although the commercial banks generally seem to support the CBR 
position. Allowing foreign branches to operate freely within Russia really would create a 
competitive situation that could threaten the interests of Russian commercial banks. 
Nevertheless, it is the central bank’s position that is somewhat puzzling and that requires some 
consideration. The CBR is broadly in favor of greater foreign access and, under its current 
leadership, it has done much to facilitate such access. Yet it rejects foreign branching. For the 
CBR, the key issue is: who regulates? A fully capitalized, locally registered subsidiary is 
effectively a local bank, albeit a foreign-owned local bank, and is regulated by the host country 
regulator—in this case, the CBR. A branch, by contrast, is not a legal entity independent of its 
parent and it thus falls under the prudential supervision of the parent bank’s home-country 
regulator.  
Concerns about branching are focused on this distinction. First, the CBR is not happy with 
the idea that banks operating in Russia will not all be subject to the same oversight. Secondly, it 
is concerned about the quality of supervision that can be expected from some foreign central 
banks, including some in offshore jurisdictions from which banks could well be expected to try 
to branch into Russia. Thirdly, it is not clear that even the most competent developed-country 
regulators have an adequate understanding of Russian realities.34 Fourthly, some Russian 
officials fear that branching would make it easier for foreign banks to withdraw from the 
Russian market in the event of a crisis; in their eyes, a fully capitalized subsidiary represents 
more of a commitment to the market.35 Finally, even if the quality of supervision is good in both 
Russia and the home jurisdiction, the different regulatory regimes associated with the two forms 
of representation can generate very different regulatory responses to the same information. 
While both arrangements have their drawbacks, the model devised by Calzolari and Lóránth 
suggests that branching is more likely to be problematic, as it likely to lead, ceteris paribus, to 
softer regulation of the home unit, while the home country regulator’s behavior towards the 
foreign unit will vary depending on its assessment of the home unit’s prospects and may be 
softer or tougher than it ought to be.36  
It is worth noting that central banks and banking regulators in many developed countries 
also dislike the presence of foreign branches in their jurisdictions and often restrict the range of 
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activities in which they may engage. This may be one reason why, to date, Russia appears to 
have been able to avoid yielding on the branch/subsidiary distinction in its bilateral WTO 
accession talks. Its May 2004 agreement with the European Union reportedly allows Russia to 
continue to insist on the creation of subsidiaries rather than branches and to retain a limit, 
rumored to be of the order of 50%, on foreign participation.37 The crucial test here will be the 
negotiations with the United States. 
‘Dirty laundry’  
Although the issue of bank protectionism has been much discussed in recent years in the context 
of WTO accession, it has most often been the banking sector pathologies, rather than its desire 
for protection, that made it a source of international conflict, or at least embarrassment, for 
Russia. This was highlighted most spectacularly in 1999–2000 with the eruption of the so-called 
‘BONY case’, which centered on the illegal movement of an estimated $7–10bn of Russian 
money through the Bank of New York (BONY) over a period of just four years.38 Of course, 
problems such as money laundering, tax evasion and illegal capital flight from Russia were 
hardly unknown prior to the summer of 1999: there had already been widespread discussion of 
these issues in the West, not least in conjunction with investigations into claims that IMF funds 
had been spirited out of the country just prior to the August 1998 financial collapse. 
Nevertheless, the New York Times investigation of BONY, which found that $4.2bn had moved 
through a single account in more than 10,000 transactions over a six-month period, highlighted 
the scale of the problem and drew attention to the involvement of an apparently ‘respectable’ 
western bank.  
It is not possible to assess with any precision the role of Russian banks in capital flight. 
Estimates of total capital flight from the country vary widely, depending on the definition and 
methodology used.39 There is, however, little doubt that the sums involved are enormous: even 
the lowest estimates suggest a figure of at least $10bn per annum since 1992 and some of the 
higher but still plausible estimates run to $20bn. These are staggering sums for an economy the 
size of Russia’s. While a large part of this money has left Russia via mechanisms that avoid the 
Russian banking system altogether (such as the failure to repatriate forex earnings from export 
operations in the first place), the Russian banks were probably directly involved in the illegal 
export of at least $5bn a year from 1992 on—and probably substantially more than that. The 
Russian authorities in the 1990s estimated that up to one-third of the funds leaving the country 
illegally were themselves the proceeds of criminal activity, which suggests that money 
laundering operations amounted to between $3bn and almost $7bn per year.40 This estimate, it 
should be noted, appears to include contraband trade in otherwise legal goods (in order to avoid 
customs duties), as well as more serious forms of organized crime, such as narcotics trafficking. 
In focusing attention on the problem, the BONY scandal prompted western banks to 
undertake widespread checks of accounts held by Russian physical and legal persons and caused 
considerable embarrassment to Russia abroad. Politicians across the Russian political spectrum 
denounced the affair as a deliberate attempt to smear Russia for political or commercial 
reasons—a claim rendered all the more plausible in Russian eyes by the speed with which 
western press coverage of the story went well beyond the known facts. Within Russia, after all, 
such stories would likely have received wide circulation only if influential interests were 
promoting them. While western headlines focused attention on large-scale money-laundering by 
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the ‘Russian mafia’, most of the suspicious transactions appear to have been attempts to evade 
taxes, tariffs or currency controls, rather than money-laundering by organized criminal groups. 
While tax evasion and capital flight were, of course, illegal, most Russian observers saw them in 
entirely different terms from laundering the proceeds of organized criminal activities.  
Nevertheless, the money laundering issue would not go away, and the BONY scandal did 
prompt the CBR to begin scrutinizing offshore transactions more closely. This was not enough, 
however, to satisfy the OECD-based Financial Action Task Force (FATF), formed by the G7 to 
coordinate efforts to combat money-laundering—the FATF placed Russia on its ‘black list’ of 
non-cooperative jurisdictions. This was not merely an embarrassment to Russia: the prospect of 
sanctions against states on the FATF threatened to complicate Russia’s integration into the world 
economy. In mid-2001, therefore, Russia at last adopted a new law on the prevention of money-
laundering and the establishment of a new Financial Monitoring Committee to which banks and 
other organizations report on certain types of financial and property transactions.41 (The 
committee became the Federal Service for Financial Monitoring during the March 2004 
reorganization of federal executive bodies.) Further amendments were adopted in October 2002, 
providing for banks to act if they have reason to believe that an account or transaction is being 
used to finance terrorist activities. The amendments also extended the remit of the original 
statute to cover a wider range of entities, including investment funds, casinos, private pension 
funds, lottery operators, bookmakers and dealers in precious metals and stones.42 The 
amendments were adopted at the request of the FATF, which in October 2002 finally removed 
Russia from its list of states that fail to fight money laundering. The FATF decision entailed the 
removal of some restrictions on western banks’ links to their Russian counterparts. In June 2003, 
the FATF went further, inviting Russia to become a full member of the task force. 
The impact of these steps is difficult to assess. While they clearly have not come anywhere 
close to putting an end to money-laundering in Russia, they should not be dismissed as 
meaningless. Within six months of the adoption of the 1999 regulations, wire transfers from 
Russian banks to offshore centers had dropped significantly, and the CBR also succeeded in 
imposing stricter requirements concerning the establishment of correspondent relations with 
offshore banks.43 In 2004, the CBR withdrew the licenses of 28 banks for failure to comply with 
anti-money-laundering rules, accusing two of those banks (Sodbiznesbank and Novocherkassk 
City Bank) of involvement in money laundering. In March 2005, the Federal Service for 
Financial Monitoring announced that it would be pressing the CBR to act against a further ten 
banks it believed to be involved in money-laundering activities. Nevertheless, as of this writing 
(April 2005), enforcement activities have focused entirely on small banks. Moreover, some 
observers have suggested that, as regulation in Russia has been tightened, Russian banks’ illegal 
activities have been increasingly conducted via their subsidiaries and affiliates in less well 
regulated CIS states, particularly in unrecognized statelets such as Abkhazia, where they are 
beyond the effective reach of any regulator. At the same time, the high level of corruption in 
Russia, the porousness of its borders and the vast international financial flows into and out of the 
country all mean that it remains a relatively attractive jurisdiction for individuals and groups 
interested in laundering the proceeds of criminal activities. 
If the BONY scandal centered on the activities of private agents, its state-centered 
counterpart was arguably the FIMACO affair, which likewise blew up in the months following 
the financial crisis. In February 1999, less than half a year after the August meltdown, it 
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emerged that the CBR had for a numbers of years in the 1990s secretly used the Jersey-
registered Financial Management Company (FIMACO) to manage a portion of its foreign 
exchange reserves. Formed in 1990 with a charter capital of just $1,000, FIMACO was a 
subsidiary of the Paris-based Eurobank, which was wholly owned by the RCB. FIMACO began 
to manage CBR funds in July 1993. While it is not unknown for central banks to rely on private 
companies to manage a portion of their funds, this idea was extremely unpopular in Russia, and 
the case of FIMACO aroused serious concerns in both Russia and the West, for a number of 
reasons. First, FIMACO’s activities were wholly opaque—its transactions, profits and losses did 
not show up anywhere in the published CBR accounts and the IMF was unaware of its existence 
until early 1999. Ordinarily, international ‘best practice’ requires that a central bank’s reserves 
be invested by and in the name of the central bank. Indeed, in the brouhaha that followed the 
initial revelations about FIMACO, it also emerged that the CBR had at times—apparently 
deliberately— mis-stated the level of its reserves. Secondly, the whole point of using private 
managers for central bank reserves is to draw on superior expertise and experience. Yet instead 
of employing an experienced and prestigious international firm, the CBR used an unknown 
subsidiary. Finally, Gerashchenko openly admitted that one purpose of FIMACO was to keep 
the CBR’s reserves hidden at a time when there was a risk they might be seized by foreign 
creditors. Technically, at least, this argument may have had some validity up to the mid-1990s: 
until the CBR’s independent status was enshrined in law, the funds it held technically belonged 
to the government and could in theory have been seized. After 1994, however, this was no 
longer the case.44  
Unlike the BONY case, the FIMACO affair did not result in criminal convictions, nor did 
any leading Russian officials even lose their jobs over it—Gerashchenko weathered the crisis, 
despite the fact that he had been chairman in 1993 when the CBR first started to use FIMACO as 
a secret offshore vehicle. The IMF did, however, insist that the CBR undergo an audit by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, the results of which were (briefly) posted on the IMF web site, over 
the protests of the CBR.45 The Fund also required the CBR to revise its method of reporting 
foreign-exchange reserves to the public, excluding such assets as loans to its foreign 
subsidiaries, and to adopt International Accounting Standards in its reporting. In the end, the 
repercussions of the FIMACO affair were less dramatic than they might have been, because 
Russia was, in any case, coming to the end of its dependence on IMF credit. Relations with the 
Fund were strained on many counts—not just over FIMACO—and the combination of oil price 
rises abroad and post-devaluation recovery at home was reducing the Fund’s leverage on the 
Russian authorities. Thus, the IMF’s demand that the CBR withdraw from its participation in the 
five state-owned banks abroad (the so-called Roszagranbanki) was never fully implemented.  
Conclusion: der Primat der Innenpolitik? 
I have chosen to conclude the above discussion with the FIMACO case, as it illustrates two 
important points that remain relevant today, not least in connection with such issues as the still 
mysterious financing of Rosneft’s purchase of Yuganskneftegaz. First, the Russian authorities 
have been as prone to exploit and manipulate the weaknesses of the country’s financial system 
as have private entrepreneurs. While this is most often linked to rent-seeking and corruption on 
the part of officials, at times it is also done in order to facilitate the implementation of specific 
policies. Secondly, as noted at the outset, most Russian banks have tended to be, first and 
foremost, tools of their owners rather than independent, profit-oriented financial intermediaries. 
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This is true of both state and private banks. In many cases, these tools have been—or are—used 
for purposes that are often nakedly opportunistic and sometimes simply criminal. Many of these 
activities spill across Russia’s borders daily, especially when it comes to tax evasion and money 
laundering, and from time to time, they cause Russia international embarrassment and even 
economic loss.  
The state of the banking system—and, indeed, of the financial sector as a whole—
undoubtedly continues to complicate Russia’s efforts to pursue integration into the international 
economy. However, the current, unreformed state of the Russian banking system suits many 
powerful domestic actors, and the international costs of such a system are frankly limited, at 
least as far as those actors are concerned. After all, Russia’s most powerful companies now face 
little difficulty in raising capital abroad. In any case, the diplomatic costs of banking weakness 
are dwarfed by the price Russia pays for its weak financial system in terms of slower growth. 
The evidence linking financial development to growth is now extremely strong, and there are 
good reasons to believe that Russia, in particular, needs a sound and efficient banking system in 
order to sustain the kind of growth rates it requires over the longer term.46 Recent progress with 
respect to banking reform suggests that this may be changing, but progress is slow and efforts to 
improve transparency and strengthen prudential supervision continue to meet fierce resistance 
from entrenched vested interests. Unless and until Russia’s governing elite is prepared to give up 
the easy, short-term rents that can be gained by manipulating an opaque and under-governed 
financial system, Russia’s banking sector is likely to remain a drag on growth at home and a 
source of periodic embarrassment abroad. 
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